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-and-
PAUL W. LARSEN CONTRACTOR, 
INC. , 
Defendant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY 
COMPANY, 
Plaint iff-Appellant , 
vs, 
PAUL W. LARSEN CONTRACTOR, INC., 
a Utah corporation; SKYLINE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, and GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent-
Case No. 14040 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 10, 1972, appellant filed a Complaint in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Complaint alleged that defen-
dant Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc. was a subcontractor of defendant 
Skyline Construction Company which was the general contractor of a Utah 
State construction project located at the University of Utah. The Complaint 
stated that the plaintiff furnished certain goods, wares, and merchandise 
consisting of electrical materials and supplies to defendants Larsen and 
Skyline, but that defendants Larsen and Skyline failed to pay for said 
electrical materials and supplies. Defendant Skyline was paid by the State 
of Utah for the contract but has failed to pay plaintiff for either the 
goods received directly by Skyline or the goods received indirectly by 
Skyline through the subcontractor Larsen, all to appellants loss in a 
sum in excess of $41,000.00. Defendant General Insurance Company of America 
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was included as a defendant in the action as the result of furnishing a 
bond insuring the payments to materialmen pursuant to provisions of Title 
14-1-5, Utah Code Annotated* (R, 110-112) The specific allegations of 
fact in the Complaint are not at issue in this appeal. 
After appellant's Complaint was filed, respondents filed motions 
to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief 
could be granted. (R. 106, 108) Respondents, through their attorney, had 
various telephone conversations and correspondence with appellant's counsel 
wherein counsel discussed the possibilities of reviewing certain pertinent 
records in preparation for resolving the issues by settlement. Other than 
these informal approaches, counsel for defendant Skyline and General 
Insurance Company took no affirmative action until August 1973. Counsel for 
defendant Larsen, who is not a party to this appeal, did submit Interrogatories 
which were answered by the plaintiff. When it appeared to plaintiff's 
counsel that the matter would not be resolved on an informal basis, plain-
tiff noticed for hearing defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 84) The 
Notice of Hearing was filed with the court by plaintiff on July 20, 1973. 
Defendants thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute, 
which was filed on August 15, 1973. (R. 85) The court denied defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss, and allowed plaintiff to amend its Complaint to speci-
fically allege the date the last material was furnished which was the subject 
matter of the suit. (R. 66) 
In September 1973 respondents requested production of certain 
documents of the appellant. (R. 60-61) Appellant furnished copies of 112 
invoices but because of the voluminous number of documents, letters, notes, 
and memoranda, contracts, purchase orders, signed delivery receipts, invoices, 
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record payments, notices, and correspondence involved, it was necessary for 
the appellant to obtain said information from various sources throughout 
its nationwide operation. (R. 36-39) In May 1974 and again in July 1974 
appellant's counsel informed respondent's counsel's office that said records 
were available for inspection, but no effort was made by respondents to 
arrange time to see the documents. (R. 36-37) 
Plaintiff had prepared a Motion to Produce, Requests for Admissions, 
and Interrogatories to defendants, but had not formally filed the same with 
the court based upon courtesy to the defendants that they should not be filed 
until the defendants had examined the documents requested by defendants 
from the plaintiff. (R« 37, 30) In January 1975, defendants filed a Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to prosecute, supported by a Memorandum but without 
supporting affidavits. The Memorandum alleged respondents had been pre-
judiced in the matter because defendants Paul Larsen Contracting Company and 
Skyline Construction had gone out of business and their employees were 
disbursed, making it awkward for defendants to defend the action. (R. 50, 54) 
Plaintiff's counsel thereafter filed with the court their Request for 
Production of Documents and Interrogatories that had been previously 
prepared. (R. 46-49) Appellant filed affidavits which were not countered 
which set forth facts in opposition to defendants' allegation that they had 
been prejudiced. (R. 38-39) 
The Motion to Dismiss was argued before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Sr., who ruled in favor of respondents and granted the respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. In a rehearing on a Motion to Amend the 
Judgment to eliminate the qualification "with prejudice," the court denied the 
motion and let the ruling stand with prejudice, barring plaintiff's right of relief 
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against respondents. It is from the court's ruling dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice with costs to the defendants that this appeal is 
taken. * 
PROPOSITION: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DISMISSING THE PLATNTTFF'S COMPLAINT AND FURTHER 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING SAID COMPLAINT 
WITH PREJUDICE 
It is generally recognized that the dismissal with prejudice of 
a cause of action by the court is an extremely harsh sanction which should 
be resorted to only in extreme cases. In Canada vs. Mathews, 449 F.2d 253, 
255 (5th Cir. 1971) the court ruled: 
••.(D)ismissal with prejudice is warranted only in 
extreme circumstances and only after the Trial Court, 
in the exercise of its unquestionable authority to 
control its own docket, has resorted to "the wide range 
of lesser sanctions which it may impose upon the litigant 
or the derelict attorney, or both." 
The Utah Supreme Court has had only limited occasion to rule on this issue, 
but has generally followed the majority of cases that hold that a dismissal 
should be permitted only in the face of a clear record of willful default 
or delay on the part of one party where other sanctions and remedies are 
insufficient. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. 
Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) heard a similar argument when 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's 
Complaint for failure to prosecute. In that case, after a lapse of almost 
nine years, the court said: 
Since any party to this action could have obtained the 
relief to which it was entitled at any time it wanted, 
but both parties chose to dally for a number of years, it was an 
abuse of discretion for the court to grant a respondent's 
motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
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Xn another Utah Supreme Court case, Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 
P.2d 275, (1960), the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval the Crystal 
Lime (infra) case in a matter where a motion for a new trial by the defen-
dant lay dormant for fifteen months before it was called up for hearing. 
In the case of Vonjonora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974) 
the Utah Supreme Court also reversed as an abuse of discretion a court 
order dismissing plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute. In that 
case, although it involved a change of counsel, nearly three and one-half 
years had elapsed after the filing of the Complaint and defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
In the case before the court the pertinent time element was a 
fifteen month period after defendants filed a Request for Production of 
Documents and January 1975 when defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to prosecute. Because of the voluminous amount of documents reques-
ted by the defendants, it took longer than usual for plaintiff to acquire 
the documents. One hundred twelve invoices had been furnished to the defense 
counsel in September 1973. (R. 56) However, additional supporting documents 
needed to be gathered from various sources throughout the country. Phone 
messages were left with the defendants approximately eight months prior 
to respondent's motion being filed, informing respondent's office of the 
availability of the requested documents. (R. 36-37) 
Respondents allege by memorandum, but without refuting affidavits, 
that they did not receive the messages left at the defense counsel's office. 
However, there is no question that respondents made no effort to attempt 
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to contact plaintiff1s counsel to inquire concerning said documents• 
Respondents allege by memorandum but without supporting evidence 
or affidavit that as a result of defendants Larsen and Skyline going out 
of business in the fall of 19 72 respondents were prejudiced in defending 
this action because of unavailability or difficulty in getting their em-
ployees to testify. Appellant's local management has provided by affidavit 
the names and present addresses of the employees of defendant Skyline 
who would have knowledge of the relevant facts pertinent to respondents1 
case. (R. 38-39) Respondents have never indicated by name any other 
unavailable witness, but they did admit in oral argument before the court 
that witnesses T. F. Beddingfield and Charlie Sparks were the people that 
have the knowledge of the detail concerning purchases from Westinghouse. 
(R. 131, lines 14-17) The Salt Lake County addresses for these two key 
witnesses were provided for respondents by plaintifffs affidavit. (R. 39) 
Also, counsel for respondents has admitted that the president and secre-
tary respectively of defendant Skyline have a personal interest in coopera-
ting with the defendant insurance company as the result of their being 
personal guarantors on the bond. (R. 131, lines 1-3) The financial status 
of defendants1 business and employees was known only to respondents and not 
to appellant, but nevertheless respondents made no attempt, even knowing the 
limitations of their evidence, to take any depositions or begin any discovery 
proceedings for over a year after commencement of the case and did not 
communicate with plaintiff about any necessity to bring the matter to an 
early conclusion. 
Although relatively few Utah Supreme Court decisions have faced 
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this issue, there have been numerous federal decisions interpreted under the 
identical federal rule. 
In Independent Productions Corporation v. Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 
730 (2nd Cir. 1960) the court commented: 
Dismissal of action with prejudice or entry of judgment by 
default are drastic remedies and should be applied only in 
extreme circumstances. 
In final analysis, a court has the responsibility to do 
justice between man and man, and general principles cannot 
justify denial of a party's fair day in court except upon 
a serious showing of willful default. 
See also De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, (2nd Cir. 1949) 176 F.2d 93 (dismissal 
with prejudice set aside). 
In Hassenflu v. Pyke, 491 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1974) the court 
found that the dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice was 
essentially punishing the plaintiff and despite flagrant misconduct by 
plaintiff's counsel reversed the lower court dismissal. Thus the courts have 
continually held a dismissal with prejudice as a drastic and an extreme 
measure that should be taken only as a last resort when all other efforts 
have failed. See also, Mann v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, 
488 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1973) and Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 
1973). 
In the case of Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963), 
in reversing the district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), the 
court stated: 
The law favors the disposition of litigation on its merits. 
Dismissal is a harsh thing and should be resorted to only 
in extreme cases. 
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See also, Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 
1959). 
In the present case the wide range of lesser sanctions available 
to the court were not used before the extreme measure of dismissal was 
invoked. In fact, the defense counsel made no effort to bring the matter 
of the time taken by plaintiff in the production of documents before the 
court prior to its Motion to Dismiss or to seek any order compelling produc-
tion or invoking sanctions upon the plaintiff. Certainly if any effort had 
been made by respondents' counsel, the communication gaps that existed between 
counsel on the availability of said documents for the eight months prior 
to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss would have come to light and the 
documents would have been inspected. There is nothing contumacious, willful, 
flagrant, or intentional about plaintiff's actions which would justify dis-
missal with prejudice. 
To guard against delays in responding to discovery, rules have 
been established providing sanctions less severe than total dismissal. 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has been especially adopted to pro-
vide sanctions for delays or failure to produce documents or make other 
discovery. Nevertheless, respondent's counsel failed to make any effort to 
even inquire of plaintiff's counsel, let alone invoke the provisions of 
this rule. Certainly if there was any unjustified delay in producing 
documents, the lesser sanctions of Rule 37 would have been the more appro-
priate and equitable remedy for the trial court to have applied in the cir-
cumstances. The question of the justification for the time necessary for 
the production of documents is an equitable element that should have been 
considered by the trial court. 
If there was any prejudice at all to the defendants it is the 
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result of respondents' own failure to act or proceed in the case. Respondents 
and their counsel were aware for over a year prior to notifying plaintiff 
that defendant Larsen was in receivorship and defendant Skyline had made an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors. (R. 74, 75, 89) During that year 
counsel for defendants made no attempt to file a Request for Production of 
Documents with the court or to seek answers to Interrogatories or to even 
notice up their own Motion to Dismiss. Such facts were not even discussed 
between the counsel during their telephone conversations. If there was 
prejudice that developed to the defendants1 position in this matter as the 
result of deteriorating conditions of defendants Larsen and Skyline, it was 
the defendants who chose it to be that way and chose not to pursue the matter 
towards a quick disposition. 
The fact that defendant General Insurance Company has been incon-
venienced in the preparation of its defense is a risk inherent in writing 
construction bonds to which they routinely must submit. In a 1970 Utah 
Supreme Court case, this same General Insurance Company of America was 
informed by this court of such a responsibility when it said in Mine and 
Smelter Supply Co, v. General Insurance Company of America, et al., 24 Utah 2d 
330, 471 P.2d 154 (1974): 
It goes without saying that Brazina (general contractor) 
having employed four subcontractors could have provided 
by the contract such controls as it deemed necessary to 
insure the payment for materials used in the construction 
and it could have provided for such supervision of the 
work so as to protect itself against the claims of 
suppliers of materials for delinquency in payment of the 
subcontractor. General Insurance Company, in supplying 
the bond, could have likewise contracted for a system 
of controls and supervision which would have protected 
against the loss it is here concerned with. The appellant 
General Insurance Company, having failed to take neces-
sary steps to protect itself against loss, cannot shift 
the burden to the plaintiff to provide that protection. 
Under the circumstances of this case, if there has been any 
prejudice to the defendants it is clearly the result of their own failure to 
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proceed or to inform the plaintiff of the necessity of a rapid disposition 
of the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Since September 1973, when respondents' Answer was filed after 
the court's denial of defendants' initial Motion to Dismiss, the following 
significant steps have been taken by the plaintiff to move the case along: 
(1) filed amendments to the Complaint; 
(2) delivered copies of all plaintiff's invoices for materials 
to counsel for defendants; 
(3) searched plaintiff's archives, record depository, and 
branch regional and national offices for requested discovery documents; 
(4) informed defendants' counsel's office of the availability 
of documents and records, May 1974; 
(5) placed a second telephone message i>out availability of 
documents and records, July 1974; 
(6) prepared Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, Motion to 
Produce, which were held from being served upon defendants until defendants 
had actually reviewed the documents available; 
(7) delivered to counsel for defendants additional discovery 
documents. 
In the same interim period defense counsel had failed to take any further 
proceedings in filing any motions before the court or seeking an expediting 
of the time for appellant to provide the requested documents, nor did 
respondents' counsel make any telephone calls or write any letters or in 
any other way seek to resolve this matter or inquire of plaintiff's 
counsel concerning the requested documents. The uncontradicted affidavits 
of appellant's district manager and appellant's attorney established the 
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reasonable efforts that were necessary to retrieve the requested documents 
and the notification of defense counsel of their availability. 
For the respondents to benefit by their failure to make any 
inquiry concerning discovery or to answer phone calls or otherwise to benefit 
by their failure to take any action in the case would be an unconscionable 
and unjust sanction against the plaintiff. This case certainly does not 
constitute the extreme circumstance in which such a drastic remedy as dis-
missal with prejudice might be considered justifiable. Certainly there is 
no evidence in the record of flagrant misconduct or willful default on 
the part of plaintiff. The record does show a complete failure of the 
respondent to take any action or make any inquiry that could amend the appa-
rent communication gap that developed between counsel in this matter. 
The dismissal of plaintifffs action was harsh and unjustified, 
and constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion against the plaintiff. 
If not reversed, said decision would be a final summary adjudication of 
plaintiff's claim permanently barring plaintiff's recovery and would be 
an unjust enrichment to defendant Skyline who has been paid for $41,357.32 
in materials furnished by appellant. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse 
the trial court, reinstate appellant's action against the respondents, 
and order the case to be set for trial upon the merits. 
r 
Respect fu l ly submit ted , 
/ . - — • " * • / 
/ ' C. Tf. HfENRIKSEN ~~-
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f and Appel lant 
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